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 
Abstract—Polar codes are a new class of error correcting 
linear block codes, whose generator matrix is specified by the 
knowledge of transmission channel parameters, code length and 
code dimension. Moreover, regarding computational security, it 
is assumed that an attacker with a restricted processing power 
has unlimited access to the transmission media. Therefore, the 
attacker can construct the generator matrix of polar codes, 
especially in the case of Binary Erasure Channels, on which this 
matrix can be easily constructed.  
In this paper, we introduce a novel method to keep the 
generator matrix of polar codes in secret in a way that the 
attacker cannot access the required information to decode the 
intended polar code. With the help of this method, a secret key 
cryptosystem is proposed based on non-systematic polar codes. In 
fact, the main objective of this study is to achieve an acceptable 
level of security and reliability through taking advantage of the 
special properties of polar codes. The analyses revealed that our 
scheme resists the typical attacks on the secret key cryptosystems 
based on linear block codes. In addition, by employing some 
efficient methods, the key length of the proposed scheme is 
decreased compared to that of the previous cryptosystems. 
Moreover, this scheme enjoys other advantages including high 
code rate, and proper error performance as well.  
Index Terms— Code based cryptography, Polar codes, Secret 
key cryptosystem. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OWADAYS, development and rapid dissemination of 
wireless communication systems have increased the 
demand for providing reliable and secure data. In this respect, 
channel coding is the study of techniques used for establishing 
a reliable communication between a sender and a receiver in 
the presence of channel errors. Cryptography is also known as 
the study of various methods employed to build secure 
communications in the presence of adversaries. In general, 
channel coding can be applied to provide two major categories 
of security; namely the information theoretic security and the 
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computational security. Utilizing practical channel codes such 
as Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes [1] and Polar 
codes [2] in the structure of wiretap channel to achieve 
secrecy capacity is an instance of applying channel codes in 
establishing information theoretic security [3, 4]. In the same 
vein, taking advantages of various channel codes in the 
structure of public/secret key code based cryptosystems can be 
regarded as an application of channel coding in providing 
computational security [5, 6]. 
It is noteworthy that code based cryptosystems provide 
security and reliability in one process to guarantee the 
confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data. 
Besides, a combination of security and reliability in the 
structure of these systems can result in reducing the 
processing cost or providing a rather higher efficiency. 
Moreover, code based cryptosystems are considered as one of 
the important classes of cryptographic systems which are 
believed to resist quantum computers [7]. Establishing a 
suitable tradeoff between security and reliability is thus one of 
the important goals in designing such cryptosystems, which 
can be properly achieved through efficient linear codes 
employed in the structure of these cryptosystems.  
The security of some code based cryptosystems is 
dependent upon the difficulty of the general decoding problem 
[8]. For an arbitrary binary linear code  , with a length of   
and dimension of  , for instance, the general decoding 
problem is that of decoding a channel output vector     
  
(          ) into the closest codeword 
    
  (          ). In this case, the Hamming distance 
between   and  ,   (   )  |{ |           }|, is minimal 
[9]. It was earlier proved that the decoding problem of 
arbitrary linear codes belongs to the class of NP-complete 
problems [8]. 
A. Related Works 
In 1978, McEliece proposed the first public key 
cryptosystem which was based on Goppa codes [5]. Compared 
with other public key cryptosystems, McElieceʼs cryptosystem 
enjoyed high speed encryption/decryption algorithms. 
However, this scheme had its own weaknesses such as low 
information rate and large key size. Later in 1984, the first 
secret key code based cryptosystem was suggested by Rao 
[10]. Although very similar to McElieceʼs cryptosystem, this 
scheme kept the public key secret. It was shown later that 
Raoʼs scheme could be broken by chosen plaintext attacks [6].  
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In 1986, Rao and Nam introduced a modified secret key 
cryptosystem which allowed the use of short length Hamming 
codes with high information rate while improving the security 
level [6]. The modified scheme was called Rao-Nam (RN) 
cryptosystem. Not unlike the McElieceʼs cryptosystem, the 
security of RN scheme relies on the difficulty level at which 
the general linear codes can be decoded. Many modifications to 
RN scheme have already been proposed which are based on 
either applying various channel codes in its structure or 
modifying the set of allowed error vectors [11-15].  
In the recent years, some efficient and secure secret key 
cryptosystems based on Turbo codes [1] and LDPC codes have 
been introduced. Turbo codes have also been employed in 
different secure channel coding schemes to be used in satellite 
communications [16, 17]. The issue of using quasi-cyclic low-
density parity-check (QC-LDPC) codes in secret key 
cryptosystems is also addressed in [18, 19]. Due to the cyclic 
and sparse structure of the parity check matrix of QC-LDPC 
codes, the key lengths of these schemes were decreased 
significantly compared with previous RN-like schemes.  
The idea of applying polar codes to provide information 
theoretic security has extensively been addressed in several 
researches [4, 20]. However, in spite of the interesting 
properties of the polar codes, these efficient codes have not 
been applied in the structure of cryptosystems based on 
general decoding problem. Recently, we introduced, for the 
first time to the best of our knowledge, the application of polar 
codes in the structure of secret key cryptosystem over binary 
erasure channel [21]. In fact, the present paper is a 
continuation and extension of our previous work in the context 
of secret key cryptosystems based on channel coding. 
B. Contributions of the proposed scheme 
The present paper is aimed at introducing a secret key 
cryptosystem which makes use of non-systematic finite length 
polar codes in an efficient way to overcome the problems 
arisen from insecure and unreliable communication channels. 
The proposed scheme is designed in such a way so as to avoid 
the weaknesses of the RN cryptosystem and is expected to 
provide more security and reliability. The main contribution of 
this work is the technique proposed for hiding the generator 
matrix of polar codes from the attacker. In fact, with the help of 
this method, the underlying cryptosystem can achieve a proper 
security level based on general decoding problem.  
It has to be noted that the proposed scheme resists against 
the typical attacks on the cryptosystems based on channel 
coding. In addition, its error performance, key length and 
computational complexity will also be investigated to assess 
the efficiency. In order to evaluate the reliability of this 
scheme, the upper bound on error probability of the polar code 
used under Successive Cancelation (SC) decoding is being 
discussed in details as well. To decrease the key size of this 
scheme, we apply efficient techniques including, (1) utilizing 
the special structure of the generator matrix of polar codes, (2) 
using the efficient method based on pseudorandom number 
generator [22] to generate the nonsingular and permutation 
matrices, and (3) exploiting the non-systematic property of 
polar codes to generate the intentional error vectors. In fact, it 
is shown that the proper tradeoff between the security and 
reliability is attainable through the proposed scheme. 
C. Outline 
The rest of this paper is organized as the follows. Sections 
II & III give brief reviews of the polar codes and Rao-Nam 
cryptosystem, respectively. The concept of using polar codes 
in the structure of secret key cryptosystem is introduced in 
Section IV. The efficiency and security levels of the proposed 
cryptosystem are also assessed in Sections V & VI 
respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper with a 
brief discussion of the future work.  
II. POLAR CODES 
In this section, a brief description of the structure of polar 
codes will be presented and subsequently, an existing 
technique for constructing their generator matrix will be 
reviewed. Polar codes are a class of linear block codes that 
provably achieve the capacity of any symmetric Binary-input 
Discrete Memoryless Channel (B-DMC), such as BEC and 
Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC). Let        be a B-
DMC with input alphabet of   {   }, output alphabet of   
and transition probabilities of { ( | )          }. Let us 
consider the following parameters for a B-DMC  [2]. 
 ( )  ∑ ∑
 
 
 ( | )   
       
 ( | )
 
  
( | )  
 
  
( | )
  
                        
  ( )  ∑ √ ( | ) ( | )
   
  
 
where  ( )  [   ] is the mutual information between the 
input and the output of   with uniform distribution on the 
input. When   is a symmetric channel,  (  ) is called the 
capacity of  and thus applied as the measure of rate. Besides, 
 ( )  [   ] is known as the Bhattacharyya parameter of   
and used as a criterion of measuring reliability. Note that 
 (  )    iff  ( )   , also  (  )    iff  ( )   . If   is a 
BEC with erasure probability  , denoted by BEC( ), then 
 ( )     and   ( )     ( )      [2].  
Let {  
( )
      } be a set of polarized binary input 
channels with indices ʻ ʼ that can be obtained by performing a 
phenomenon on the   independent copies of given B-DMC 
 . This phenomenon is called channel polarization and the 
polarized binary input channels are called bit-channels or sub-
channels. By exploiting the channel polarization, the 
symmetric capacity terms { (  
( ))       } and 
Bhattacharya parameters { (  
( ))       } of all   bit-
channels tend to 0 or 1 if   is large enough [2]. In the 
remainder of this paper, the Bhattacharya parameter of  -th bit-
channel,  (  
( )), is denoted by     . Besides, we consider the 
methods which are proposed to obtain the Bhattacharya 
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parameters of the bit-channels. Such parameters are necessary 
to construct the generator matrix of polar codes.  
Let   {       } be a set of all bit-channel indices. Let 
  be a  -element subset of   which is called information set. 
Let    be an (   )-element subset of   which is a 
complement to the subset   and is called frozen (fixed) set. 
These sets are specified in such a way that           for all 
        . In other words, it is possible to construct   bit-
channels such that their   ( ) with indices in the information 
set tend to become reliable or noiseless and their  (   (  )) 
with indices in the frozen set tend to become unreliable or 
noisy [2, 23]. 
A. Constructing the Generator Matrix 
Consider          and   [
  
  
]. Given the rate 
   ( ) and the dimension      , a     generator 
matrix    is constructed for any (   ) polar code through the 
following steps [24]: 
1) Compute the  -th kronecker product        which 
gives an     matrix. Then, label the rows of    from 
top to bottom as               . 
2) Obtain the Bhattacharyya parameters of all   bit-
channels in the form of    (          ) through 
the following recursive formula with initial condition 
    .  
          
                {
          
                    
      
                      
                                
(1) 
 
If the channel   is a BEC( ), the initial condition      is  
equal to  . 
3) Form a permutation    (         ) for the set of   bit-
channel indices   {       } in such a way that the 
inequality                     is satisfied. 
4) Obtain the information set     whose bit-channel 
indices correspond to   leftmost indices of the 
permutation   , i.e.          . Then, obtain the frozen set 
     whose bit-channel indices correspond to     
rightmost indices of the permutation   , i.e. 
                . 
5) Construct the generator matrix    by choosing   rows of 
the matrix    which correspond to the bit-channel 
indices of the information set  . If the bit-channel  
( )
 is 
chosen, then the  -th row of    is selected. Also, 
construct (   )    matrix     by selecting     rows 
of    corresponding to the bit-channel indices of the 
frozen set   .   
In short, the Bhattacharya parameters {          } of all 
bit-channels {  
( )      } are generated by recursive 
formula (1). Then, the generator matrix    is constructed by 
choosing the   rows of the matrix    whose indices 
correspond to bit-channels with the least possible 
Bhattacharya parameters.  
B. Non-Systematic Encoding 
Polar codes, introduced in [2], are in fact non-systematic 
codes. In systematic encoding, the information bits appear 
transparently as part of the codeword, while this is not the case 
in the non-systematic encoding. In the case of non-systematic 
polar codes with block length of  , an input vector   
(          )  (      ) consists of two subvectors, namely 
the information vector, which is a  -bit subvector    (     
 ) and the frozen (fixed) vector which is an (   )-bit 
subvector     (      
 ). The information vector    
comprises of information data that is free to change in each 
process of transmission, while the frozen vector consists of 
fixed values known to decoder [25]. In addition, the input 
vector   is encoded to  -bit codeword   as follows, 
                    . 
Since          is a fixed vector, the encoder mapping    to 
  is non-systematic [25]. The code rate is defined as   
|  | | |⁄  | |  ⁄  which can be adjusted by selecting the size of 
information set  . The coordinates of the information vector 
can be transmitted at a rate close to 1 through noiseless bit-
channels. However, the coordinates of the frozen (fixed) 
vector can be transmitted at a rate close to 0 across the noisy 
bit-channels. Therefore, polar codes are efficient for channel 
coding [2]. 
C. Successive Cancellation Decoding 
Let   be an  -bit codeword of the polar codes which is 
transmitted across the   bit-channels. Let   be the 
corresponding channel output vector which is decoded by the 
low complexity SC decoding algorithm. The main goal of the 
SC decoder is to obtain the estimated input vector by the 
knowledge of information set     frozen vector     and as well 
as the channel output vector  . The bits of input vector are 
estimated successively at the SC decoder in the following way 
[2],  
 ̂  {
                             
 
  (  
   ̂ 
   )         
   
where decision functions     
            , are 
computed as below for all    
      ̂ 
        , 
  (  
   ̂ 
   )  {
                     
  
( )
(  
  ̂ 
   | )
  
( )
(  
  ̂ 
   | )
  
                                           
.  
The information bits       , are estimated one by one 
using the  -th decision element after the channel output vector 
  and the previous estimated information bits  ̂ 
    are known. 
Furthermore, the value of frozen bits,       
 , is known to 
the SC decoder. It has been proved that for any given B-DMC 
 , the error probability under SC decoding is upper bounded 
as follows [2],  
                                                ∑        .                               (2) 
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Also, it has been indicated that reliable communication 
using SC decoder is obtained when the following relation is 
satisfied [26, 27], 
 
                                        ( )      ⁄ ,                               (3) 
where   is the scaling exponent, whose values depends on the 
choice of channel. Its value for BEC, for instance, is 
approximately equal to 3.627. Indeed, reliable communication 
under SC decoding for any B-DMC   is obtained when the 
rate is less than the capacity at least to the extent of     ⁄ . It 
can be considered as a tradeoff between the rate and the block 
length of polar codes for a given error probability, when the 
SC decoder is utilized [27]. In this paper, the maximum 
possible code rate fulfilling (3) is named by cutoff rate and 
denoted by   .  
III. THE RAO-NAM CRYPTOSYSTEM 
The Rao-Nam (RN) cryptosystem is an important secret key 
code based cryptosystem used as a reference to measure the 
security and efficiency of secret key cryptosystems based on 
error correcting codes. In this section, the structure of RN 
scheme is being described, followed by an in-depth 
investigation of its drawbacks.   
A. Secret  Key 
The secret key of the RN scheme consists of the parameters 
{       } which are explicated as follows [6]: 
1) Let   be a     generator matrix of the binary linear 
code  . 
2) Let   be a     random binary nonsingular matrix 
(scrambler). 
3) Let   be an     random binary permutation matrix 
(permutor).  
In RN cryptosystem, a set of predetermined  -bit 
intentional error vectors,   {         }, with cardinality 
    
    is considered which has two main properties. The 
first property, called the weight property, is that all error 
vectors have the average Hamming weight equal to half of the 
code length,   ( )    ⁄ . The second property, i.e. the 
syndrome property, is that no distinct error vector is located in 
the same coset of   [28]. According to these definitions, the 
syndrome error table can be defined as follows. 
4) Let   {   
 |    } be a predetermined set of error 
vectors which is also called the syndrome error table. 
This set consists of      cosets each of which has a 
distinct syndrome       
 . Therefore, any set of  -bit 
error vectors can be selected, one from each of      
cosets. 
B. Encryption 
A  -bit message   (          ) is encrypted into an 
 -bit ciphertext   (          ) as shown below [6].  
  (     )                    , 
where    is a     encryption matrix. Besides,   denotes an 
 -bit intentional error vector selected randomly from the 
syndrome error table  .  
C. Decryption 
A ciphertext   is decrypted into a plaintext   using secret 
keys     ,    and    following the steps below [6]. 
1) Compute                   ,     .                                      
2) Calculate the syndrome                  
   ,      . Find the corresponding error vector   
from the syndrome error table  . 
3) Obtain          and recover    using the decoding 
algorithm.  
4) Multiply   by     to retrieve the message . 
D. Weaknesses 
The RN scheme has several drawbacks as being discussed 
below: 
1) One of disadvantages of the RN scheme is that it needs 
to store the matrices     and   . Similarly, the syndrome 
error table   should be saved to remove the errors in the 
decryption process. Therefore, a large amount of secret 
keys are exchanged and stored by both the sender and 
the receiver [6].  
2) Yet another practical problem of this scheme lies in the 
small number of error vectors for their recommended 
code parameters, e.g.     
       for (     ) 
Hamming code. Hence, the RN scheme is vulnerable to 
chosen plaintext attacks [6]. Another drawback is the 
possibility of estimating the rows of encryption matrix 
   of this scheme using the majority voting analysis [28, 
29]. 
3) In RN scheme, there exists a tradeoff between the code 
rate and the security. In fact, the code length   is 
impractical for having a high code rate and a large 
number of intentional error vectors [11]. Furthermore, 
the RN scheme preserves the error correction capability 
of the employed code only partially [30].   
Given the mentioned shortcomings, this research attempts 
to address these problems through applying the interesting 
properties of non-systematic polar codes and other efficient 
methods.  
IV. THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM 
The proposed secret key cryptosystem is designed based on 
finite length polar codes so that channel errors are corrected 
and the information is concealed from an unauthorized user. 
To this end, we consider the transmission over a BEC( ), as it 
has been shown that among all the B-DMCs  , the best 
tradeoff between rate and reliability belongs to BEC. In other 
words, for a BEC, the Bhattacharyya parameter  ( ) is 
minimized among all channels with a given capacity  ( )  
   ( ). Besides, given the general B-DMCs, no efficient 
algorithm has been introduced so far to calculate the 
Bhattacharya parameters. For a BEC, however, these 
parameters are constructed efficiently using (1) [2]. 
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Therefore, unlike the other B-DMCs, the method used for 
constructing polar codes is simple for the BECs and can thus 
be performed with a complexity of  ( ) [24].  
A. A technique for hiding the generator matrix of polar codes 
In the computational security, it is assumed that the attacker 
has unlimited access to the transmission channel. Moreover, 
the generator matrix of the polar codes has a channel dependent 
structure. This can imply that the attacker can specify the 
generator matrix of these codes using the channel parameters, 
length and dimension of the intended polar code. The main 
question  being addressed in the currecnt study is that of how 
to keep the generator matrix of polar codes secret from the 
attacker to use these efficient codes in the structure of 
cryptosystems based on general decoding problem. In response 
to this issue, an efficient method is being proposed here, 
through which, an attacker cannot construct the hidden 
generator matrix of polar codes over BEC( ) even if the 
parameters     and   are known. Letʼs consider the set of   
bit-channel indices   {       }, the permutation    
(                 ) and the cutoff rate    for an (   ) polar 
code, as defined in Section II. 
Remark 1. The     bit-channels are regarded as Good bit-
channels if the corresponding Battacharya parameters are 
minimized (i.e. the least error probability) among all   bit-
channels. That is, the indices of good bit-channels in the set   
correspond to the indices {            }    .  
Remark 2. The  (    ) bit-channels are regarded as Bad 
bit-channels if the corresponding Battacharrya parameters are 
maximized (i.e. the most error probability) among all   bit-
channels. That is, the indices of bad bit-channels in the set   
correspond to the indices {                  }    .  
The following section explains how the generator matrix of 
polar codes can be kept secret.  
1) Consider the method of constructing the generator matrix 
for an (   ) polar code as discussed in Section II-A. 
First, all Bhattacharya parameters of   bit-channels, 
          , and the permutation    are constructed. 
Now, in order to keep the generator matrix secret,   
indices are selected randomly from the indices of good 
bit-channels. Indeed, this step is equivalent to the random 
selection of   bit-channels from     good bit-channels. 
Subsequently, the randomly selected indices of the set   
are considered as the secret information set, denoted by 
 ( ). In fact,  ( ) is the subset of   with   randomly 
selected indices of good bit-channels.  
The secret generator matrix   ( ) is defined as a     
submatrix of    whose   rows are chosen in accordance 
with the indices of  ( ). If the cutoff rate   , the length 
 , and the dimension  , are selected properly, the 
number of polar codes equivalent to the used code is 
large enough. In this case, an attacker cannot obtain the 
secret generator matrix in polynomial time. However, as 
it is discussed in Section V-A, most probably, this 
selection is not the best choice to achieve channel 
capacity. Indeed, there is a tradeoff between the security 
and efficiency which is usually inevitable in 
cryptosystems based on channel coding.  
2) The secret frozen (fixed) set, denoted by   ( ), is a subset 
of   whose elements are the     non-selected indices 
of the set   in step 1. Moreover, the secret matrix    ( ) is 
defined as an (   )    submatrix of    whose     
rows are chosen based on the indices of the secret frozen 
set.  
3) In order to have a more secure decoding process, the 
frozen vector should be concealed from an adversary. 
Since the polar code performance is not sensitive to the 
manner in which the frozen vector is selected, it makes 
no big difference how this vector is chosen [2]. 
Therefore, in the encryption/decryption process of the 
proposed scheme, an (   )-bit randomly chosen vector 
is generated by an (   )-bit LFSR to be used as the 
secret frozen vector, denoted by    ( ). As a result, the 
number of possible frozen vectors is equal to    
      . As long as the length and dimension of the 
employed polar code are selected properly, the attacker 
cannot find the secret frozen vector in polynomial time. 
The inputs to SC decoder of polar codes are the channel output 
vector, the information set and the frozen vector. Hence, by 
hiding the information set and the frozen vector using the 
above technique, the attacker cannot decode the channel 
output vector   to the estimated input vector  ̂ in polynomial 
time. Fig. 1(a, b) represents the proposed concept for 
providing security based on polar codes.  
 
     
       Good 
bit-channels
              Bad 
bit-channels
Selecting 
randomly 
    good 
bit-channels
remained 
bit-channels
 
                                                                (a) 
   
         
remained
 bit-channels
Secret 
frozen 
vector
    randomly
selected good
 bit-channels    
    
 
     
Secret 
information 
vector 
 
                                                               (b) 
Fig. 1. The proposed concept for providing security based on polar codes,         
(a). The   bit-channels are selected randomly from     good bit-channels,           
(b). The secret information vector is transmitted through   randomly selected 
good bit-channels. Also, the secret frozen vector is transmitted across     
remained bit-channels 
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It is observable from Fig. 1(a) that, in order to hide the 
generator matrix   ( ), the   bit-channels are selected 
randomly from     good bit-channels. In Fig. 1(b), the secret 
information vector, denoted by   ( ), is transmitted through 
the   randomly selected good bit-channels. Besides, it can be 
viewed that the secret frozen vector is transmitted across 
the    remained bit-channels. In this case, should the 
parameters  ,   and    are selected properly, an attacker 
cannot recognize on which bit-channels the secret information 
vector is transmitted. Thus the secret generator matrix   ( ) 
cannot be constructed by the attacker even if the transmission 
channel parameters, the length and dimension of the utilized 
polar code are known. 
B. Secret Key 
The set of keys which should be kept secret is   
{  ( )      }. In this set,   ( ) is a     generator matrix of 
polar codes requiring    bits of memory,    is a set of  -bit 
intentional error vectors requiring | | bits of memory,   is a 
     random binary nonsingular matrix and   is an   
  random binary permutation matrix which require    and 
   
   bits of memory, respectively. By saving the set  , the key 
length of the proposed scheme enlarges. Therefore, efficient 
methods are applied to reduce the size of the exchanged  key 
dramatically. In this case, the secret key set is   
{  ( )            } which consists of the parameters as 
follows: 
1) As mentioned before, the secret generator matrix of an 
(   ) polar code is defined as the     submatrix of    
whose rows are chosen based on the indices of the secret 
information set  ( ). Hence, it will suffice to store only 
 ( ) instead of   ( ). On the other hand, since the secret 
frozen set is complement to secret information set and 
requires less memory to save, so it is possible to store  
  ( ) instead of  ( ). 
2) Let     be a (    )-bit initial vector to generate a binary 
pseudorandom sequence                   by a (    )-
bit LFSR. The generated pseudorandom sequence is used 
to construct the binary nonsingular matrix      (see 
Section V-B for more details). 
3) Let     be an (   )-bit initial vector of LFSR to generate 
a binary pseudorandom sequence                by an 
(   )-bit LFSR. The generated pseudorandom sequence 
can be used to construct the binary permutation matrix 
     (see Section V-B for more details). 
4) Let     be an (   )-bit initial vector to generate an 
(   )-bit vector by an (   )-bit LFSR. Due to the 
non-systematic property of the employed polar code, the 
generated vector is used as secret frozen vector    ( ). 
Thus,      ( )   ( ) can be considered as an  -bit 
intentional error vector and   {         } with 
cardinality     
    as a set of  -bit intentional error 
vectors. Apparently, unlike the RN cryptosystem, there is 
no need to store the syndrome error table  . 
It will be illustrated later in Section VI that reducing the key 
size of the proposed scheme by these efficient methods does 
not decrease the security level of the system. 
C. Encryption 
1) The sender first randomly chooses a code in a family of 
equivalent (   ) polar codes by selecting   indices at 
random from     indices of good bit-channels. Then, the 
sender generates an (   )-bit frozen vector randomly 
using an LFSR with the initial value    . In order to 
perform the decryption process properly, it is necessary 
to synchronize the sender and the receiver. This way, the 
frozen vector employed by the sender is known to the 
receiver synchronously. Subsequently, an intentional 
error vector   is constructed.  
2) Finally, each  -bit message   is encrypted into an  -bit 
ciphertext   as shown below. 
 
                                (    ( )     ( )   ( ))  
                ( )     ( )   ( )  
                                       ,                                        (4) 
 
where       ( )  is a     encryption matrix 
equivalent to the generator matrix   ( ). 
D. Decryption 
The ciphertext   is transmitted over the insecure channel 
and the channel output vector           
         is 
decrypted by the authorized receiver as described below.  
1) The transposed permutation matrix,   , is multiplied by 
the channel output vector   and      
 
      
    ( )        
  is computed to remove the 
permutation matrix   . In this case,     
  is a vector 
having the same Hamming weight as    .  
2) The authorized receiver makes use of the secret initial 
value     to generate the secret frozen vector. Then, the 
set { ( )    ( )  
 } is considered as the input to the SC 
decoder. Finally, the input vector   (  ( )    ( ))  
(      ( )) is estimated by the SC decoder as: 
 
                               ̂  {
                                  
 ( )
  ( 
 
 
   ̂ 
   )              ( )
, 
 
where the decision function     
         ,    ( ), 
is defined as: 
 
              ̂    ( 
 
 
   ̂ 
   )  {
           
  
( )
(   
 
 ̂ 
   | )
  
( )
(   
 
 ̂ 
   | )
  
                                   
,     ( ). 
 
3) Having obtained the secret information vector   ( )  
   using the SC decoder, we can now recover the 
message as    ( ) 
  . 
The secret information set  ( ) and secret frozen vector    ( ) 
are necessary to initiate the SC decoder. Therefore, it is 
computationally infeasible for any unauthorized user to 
correct channel errors without the knowledge of parameters 
( ( )    ( )). Fig. 2 illustrates the block diagram of the 
proposed cryptosystem. As can be viewed from this figure, at 
the first step, the message is multiplied by the nonsingular 
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matrix  . Then the  -bit secret information vector   ( )     
is encoded to the  -bit codeword     ( )  ( )     ( )   ( ). 
Eventually, the  -bit ciphertext      is obtained through 
multiplying the codeword   by the permutation matrix  . 
Source
Polar code
Encoder
Insecure 
Channel
Destination
SC
Decoder
Decipher
Encipher
Fig. 2.  Block diagram of the proposed cryptosystem. 
The received vector   is also arrived at by transmitting the 
ciphertext through an insecure channel, which is then 
multiplied by the transposed permutation matrix. In the next 
step, the vector   ( ) is obtained by performing the SC 
decoding on the -bit vector       . Finally, the message   
is recovered by multiplying the vector   ( ) by the inverse of 
the nonsingular matrix  . 
V. EFFICIENCY 
 The efficiency of the proposed cryptosystem is evaluated in 
terms of its error performance, key length and computational 
complexity. A detailed account of the observations is being 
provided below. 
A. Error Performance 
The error performance of the used finite length polar codes 
is being analyzed under SC decoding. Yet the following 
remarks are to be taken into consideration first: 
Remark 3. Let    be a subset of   {       } whose 
elements correspond to the indices {          }    . The 
minimum upper bound on error probability under SC 
decoding is equal to the sum of Battacharya parameters of   
bit-channels whose indices are the elements of the subset   , 
i.e.     ∑         . 
It has to be noted that this upper bound is the same as the 
standard upper bound on error probability of polar codes under 
SC decoding [2]. 
Remark 4. Let    be a subset of   {       } whose 
elements correspond to the indices 
{                        }    . The maximum upper bound 
on error probability under SC decoding is equal to the sum of 
the Battacharya parameters of   bit-channels whose indices 
are the elements of the subset   , i.e.     ∑         .   
In the proposed scheme, since   bit-channels are selected 
randomly from     good bit-channels, the upper bound on the 
error probability can vary from     to     depending on the sum 
of the Battacharya parameters of   selected good bit-channels. 
In the sequel of this section, it will be discussed how some 
parameters such as erasure probability  , code length  , code 
rate  , and the manner in which the secret information set  ( ) 
is selected can affect     and    . 
If the transmission channel is BEC( ), the initial value of 
the recursive formula (1) will be       . Therefore, the 
erasure probability   should be considered such that reliable 
communication is achieved. In this work, we consider the 
condition       
   to have a reliable communication where 
  has different values, depending on the application of the 
proposed scheme. Here, we select     and based on which 
the analysis of the error performance is subsequently carried 
out. The erasure probabilities of BEC should be considered in 
a way that     is less than or equal to   
  . In this case,     is 
definitely less than     . As shown in table I,  erasure 
probability varies in different intervals depending on the code 
lengths to satisfy the condition        
  . 
TABLE I  
DIFFERENT INTERVALS ON ERASURE PROBABILITY TO SATISFY      
   
    
   [      ] 
    [      ] 
    [      ] 
    [      ] 
    [      ] 
It is obvious that for larger code lengths, we can provide 
larger intervals on   to achieve reliable communication. In 
addition, the code rate should be chosen in a way that     . 
In this scheme, in order to obtain a secure and reliable 
communication, finite length polar codes with high rate are 
employed. For instance, we consider a (         ) polar code 
with          over BEC(0.01). Note that for BECs with 
larger or smaller  , it is possible to select other code rates 
depending on the application. For example, we will have 
       if         for the fixed block length      .  
Fig. 3 presents the variations of     and     in terms of 
  [       ]. The polar code of length    
   is considered 
over BECs with                . Two sets of three curves are 
depicted in this figure.  The solid and the dashed lines plot     
and     vs. code rate, respectively. As is evident in this figure, 
    depends on the variations of the rate and erasure 
probability. Furthermore, the cutoff rate    is increased as the 
erasure probability   is decreased. It is also viewed that the 
cutoff rate    is equal to          and      for the erasure 
probabilities of          and     , respectively. This signifies 
the possibility to achieve reliable communication at higher 
code rates by increasing the cutoff rate   .  
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Fig. 3.  Variations of     and     vs. rates   [       ] for the polar code of 
length        over BECs with                . 
On the other hand,     is rate-independent. The main reason 
behind this is that the Battacharya parameters corresponding 
to set    are rather small (approximately close to zero) 
compared to the ones corresponding to set   . Therefore, 
unlike the upper bound    , the value of     is invariable in 
terms of rates. For the (        ) polar code over BEC(0.01), 
the upper bound on the error probability can vary from 
    ∑                     
    to     ∑             
           . According to remarks 3 and 4,    and    are 
the subsets of   {          } whose elements correspond 
to the indices {            }        and  {              }  
     , respectively. 
The code length   is another parameter affecting     and     
in the proposed scheme. Fig. 4 depicts the variations of     
and     in terms of the rates   [      ] for the polar codes of 
lengths           over BEC(    ). It is observable that both 
   and     are decreased as the code length is increased. 
Further, the cutoff rate    increases as the code length is 
enlarged. As can be seen, for the lengths           , the 
cutoff rate    is equal to 0.8 and 0.89, respectively. In other 
words, it is possible to achieve reliable communication at 
higher code rates through increasing the code length. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Variations of     and     vs. rates   [      ] for the polar codes of 
lengths          over BEC(    ). 
Moreover, as mentioned before, the intentional error vectors 
     ( )   ( ) do not affect the error correction capability of 
the polar codes as the polar code performance is not sensitive 
to the way the frozen vector    ( ) is selected. Therefore, the 
error correction capability of the polar codes is fully preserved 
in this scheme.  
B. Key Length 
In this scheme, the memory requirement of the secret key set 
  {  ( )            } is computed as below: 
 As mentioned before, the secret frozen set   ( ) can be 1)
saved instead of the generator matrix   ( ). On the other 
hand, the largest possible bit-channel index, i.e.   
    , might be one of the indices in   ( ). Such bit-
channel index requires 11 bits to save in binary form. 
Hence, the upper bound on the required memory to store 
  ( ) is computed as   ( )    (   )       bits.  
 The required memory to store the initial value     is 2)
computed as             bits. 
In this scheme, a (        ) polar code is considered to 
obtain reasonable reliability and security simultaneously. On 
the other hand, if the nonsingular matrix          and the 
permutation matrix            are saved directly, the key 
length grows too large. Consequently, we attempt to apply the 
efficient method introduced in [22] to reduce the key length. 
This method is based on pseudorandom number generators, 
i.e. LFSRs, to reduce the memory requirements of these 
matrices. In this case, the short initial values     and     are 
saved instead of the matrices   and  , respectively. This 
method takes advantage of a special type of matrices, called 
double-one (DBO) matrices [31], in which every single row or 
column contains exactly two 1s. The DBO matrix is called a 
DBO-1 matrix if all 1s in the matrix can be connected in a 
unique cycle alternately in the column and row directions. It 
has to be noted that all DBO-1 matrices are singular, and the 
rank of any     DBO-1 matrix is     according to [31]. 
By adding one ʻ1ʼ to any entry of a     DBO-1 matrix, 
we obtain the nonsingular matrix of rank  . Based on this 
interesting property, the first algorithm is introduced in [22] to 
construct a nonsingular matrix      from a relatively short 
seed. The input of this algorithm is an initial value, i.e.    , of 
a (    )-bit LFSR which is applied to generate a 
pseudorandom sequence               with  s in the last two 
bits. These random bits are then used to specify the location of 
1s in the     DBO-1 matrix. At the final stage of this 
algorithm, one ʻ1ʼ is added to any entry of the constructed 
    DBO-1 matrix. Given the property of DBO-1 matrices, 
the output matrix is indeed a nonsingular matrix     . In fact, 
this algorithm has a one-to-one mapping from the initial value 
    to the nonsingular matrix     .  
In the second algorithm introduced in [22], a binary 
permutation matrix      is generated from an     DBO-1 
matrix by inverting the even positions of ls in its cycle, 
counting from any position. The input of this algorithm is an 
initial value, i.e.    , of an (   )-bit LFSR which is used to 
generate a pseudorandom sequence              with one ʻ0ʼ 
in the last bit. These random bits are then employed to specify 
the location of 1s in the permutation matrix     . In fact, there 
exists a one to one mapping from the initial value     to the 
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permutation matrix     . An in-depth account of the 
functionality of these algorithms is beyond the scope of this 
paper, yet interested readers are referred to [22, 31] for a 
detailed description. 
 Thus, with the help of the above mentioned method, the 3)
memory requirements for storing the nonsingular matrix 
     and the permutation matrix      are reduced to 
               and               bits, 
respectively. 
Therefore, the upper bound on the key length can be 
calculated as: 
      ( )                      . 
Table II provides a comparison between the key length of the 
proposed cryptosystem and those of the previous RN-like 
cryptosystems. 
                             TABLE II. 
COMPARISON OF THE KEY LENGTHS. 
            
Scheme 
 
Code 
 
Key Length 
Rao [10]  (        ) 2 Mbits 
Rao-Nam [6]  (     )  18 kbits 
Struik-Tilburg [11]  (     )  18 kbits 
Sun-Shieh [14]  (     )  42 kbits 
Proposed Scheme  (        )  5 kbits 
It can be seen from the table that, although the length and 
dimesion of the polar code used in our scheme is much larger, 
the key length of our scheme is shorter than that of the 
previous RN-like cryptosystem.  
C. Computational Complexity 
The computational complexity of the proposed scheme 
consists of two parts: Encryption complexity (    ) and 
Decryption complexity (    ). The encryption complexity can 
be expressed as: 
         (  )      (  ( ))      (  ),         
Where     (  )   ( 
 ) is the number of binary operations 
necessary to multiply the  -bit message   by the nonsingular 
matrix     .     (  ( ))   (     ) is the complexity of 
polar encoding and     (  )   ( ) is the number of binary 
operations required for multiplying the  -bit codeword   by 
the permutation matrix     . In a similar vein, the decryption 
complexity of this scheme is defined as follows: 
         (  
 )     ( 
 )       (  ( ) 
  ), 
Where     (  
 )   ( ) is the number of required binary 
operations to perform the product of  -bit received vector   
by the transposed form of the permutation matrix  . 
Moreover, the complexity of SC decoding is    ( 
 )  
 (     ) [2], and the number of required binary operations 
for multiplying the  -bit vector   ( ) by the inverse matrix  
    
is obtained as     (  ( ) 
  )   (  ). 
VI. SECURITY 
Some cryptanalytic attacks such as Brute Force, Rao-Nam, 
Struik-Tilburg and Majority Voting have already been 
suggested to threat the secret key cryptosystems based on 
channel coding. In this section, the cryptanalytic strength of 
the proposed scheme against these attacks is being examined.  
A. Brute Force Attack 
In the Brute Force attack, all possible keys are checked 
systematically until the correct key is found. However, this 
attack can be avoided simply if the key space is large enough.  
In the proposed cryptosystem, the number of parameters of 
the secret key set   { ( )            } is obtained as 
explained below: 
1) Since the sender selects the   bit-channels 
randomly from all     good bit-channels, the number of 
equivalent polar codes is defined as: 
 
                                          (   )  (
   
 
) .   
 
On the other hand, the total number of (        ) 
equivalent polar codes over BEC(    ) with         is 
equal to   (        )   
   . Therefore, the existing 
equivalent polar codes are large enough to resist against 
the brute force attack. 
2) The number of binary nonsingular scrambling matrices 
     is equal to the number of pseudorandom sequences 
                  which are used to specify the locations 
of 1s in     DBO-1 matrices. Hence, the number of 
these binary matrices is equal to          
      . 
For the (        ) polar code, the preliminary attempts 
made by the adversary to find the nonsingular matrix 
would be impractical. 
3) The number of binary permutation matrices      is 
equal to the total number of pseudorandom sequences 
               used to specify the locations of 1s in 
    DBO-1 matrices. Thus, the number of these 
matrices is equal to          
     . As a result, 
finding the permutation matrix is infeasible in 
polynomial time. 
4) The number of possible  -bit intentional error vectors 
     ( )   ( ) is equal to the number of (   )-bit 
frozen vectors, i.e.          
        . Hence, 
finding the intentional error vector by an exhaustive 
search is impossible. 
Therefore, because of the large number of involved 
parameters, the exhaustive search for finding the parameters 
of the secret key set is likely to end in failure. 
B. Rao-Nam  Attack  
The Rao-Nam (RN) attack is a chosen plaintext attack 
operating in the following steps [6]: 
 Computing the encryption matrix    from a large set of  1)
plaintext-ciphertext (   ) pairs. 
 Recovering the message   from the ciphertext   using    2)
obtained in Step 1. 
The encryption algorithm of the proposed cryptosystem 
(Relation (4)) can be rewritten as: 
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                                        ( )     ( )   ( )  
                                            
                                           ,                                            (5)    
where    [   
 ]                   is an encryption 
matrix and     (  
    
      
  ) is the permuted intentional 
error vector. Let    and    be two  -bit plaintext vectors 
differing only in the  -th,           position. Let    
   
    
  and       
    
  be two distinct  -bit ciphertext 
vectors achieved from the plaintexts    and   , respectively. 
The difference vector of       is thus computed as: 
            (     ) 
  (  
    
 )    
  (  
    
 ). 
Besides, the  -th row of the encryption matrix   
  is 
achievable through the following equation: 
                                   
        (  
    
 ).                             (6)     
It is obvious that the Hamming weight of (  
    
 ) is at 
most    ( 
 ), where   ( 
 ) is the Hamming weight of the 
permuted error vector   . Since the matrix   is a permutation 
matrix,   ( 
 )    ( ). If    ( )  ⁄   , the difference 
vector       represents one estimate of   
 . This procedure 
should be followed for all           to obtain the 
encryption matrix   .  
In the following, the required number of binary operations 
(work factor) for constructing the encryption matrix    is 
being computed. Let      
      and      
      be 
two distinct  -bit ciphertexts of the proposed scheme obtained 
from the same message . The difference between    and    is 
calculated as          
    
 . This process should be tested 
until one of the values obtained for   
    
  satisfies (6). Note 
that the complete construction of encryption matrix    must be 
verified, as the correctness of each vector   
  cannot be verified 
independently. Since the number of distinct error vectors of 
this scheme is equal to     
   , the number of all possible 
pairs (     ) is equal to (
  
 
)  (  
    )  ⁄ . In addition, the 
vector   
  should be computed for each of the   rows of   , so 
that the work factor of this attack is computed as    
 
 
(
  
 
 
)
 
. For     
   , the work factor is obtained as    
 ( (   ) ) [6]. Obviously, this attack is infeasible for the 
proposed cryptosystem given the fact that the number of error 
vectors,    
   , is too large.  
Furthermore, Rao and Nam claimed that this attack can also 
be resisted by applying the set of intentional error vectors with 
a Hamming weight of   ( )    ⁄  [6]. Later, Meijers and 
Tilburg [28] showed that the RN cryptosystem is vulnerable 
to Extended Majority Voting (EMV) attack due to the 
constraint on the Hamming weight of the intentional error 
vectors. In fact, the predefined set of error vectors has to be 
chosen at random. In the proposed scheme, there is not any 
constraint on the Hamming weight of the intentional error 
vectors which in turn improves the security. 
C. Struik-Tilburg  Attack  
Let   {         } and  
  {          } denote a 
set of distinct error vectors and their permuted error vectors, 
respectively. Also, consider     {                   } 
as a set of difference intentional error vectors. Similarly, 
  
  {              } is the set of difference permuted 
intentional error vectors. Since there are    distinct permuted 
error vectors, the set of    distinct ciphertexts is obtained as 
  {     
            }. The performance of the 
Struik-Tilburg (ST) attack is described in the following steps 
[11]:  
 First, an arbitrary message  is enciphered so that a set   1)
is yielded.  
 A directed labeled graph   (    
 ) is constructed 2)
whose vertices consist of    different ciphertexts and 
each edge from vertex    to vertex    is labeled as the 
difference permuted intentional error vector       
     . Afterwards, an automorphism group    ( ) is 
constructed, consisting of all the permutations on   in 
which all the edges       remained unchanged. Hence, 
the cardinality of the automorphism group is  |   ( ) |  
  . 
 For      , a message         is selected where 3)
   is a unit vector with one ‘1’ in its  -th position and the 
rest 0s. Next, steps 1 and 2 are repeated for      to 
construct a set of its corresponding ciphertexts  ( )  
{  
( )
    
   ̂ 
( )
              } and its 
directed label graph    ( 
( )   
 ). 
 For      , an automorphism   is selected randomly 4)
from the automorphism group    ( ). Then,    is 
mapped on   according to the selected automorphism  . 
Now,   
( )
       
   ̂ 
( )           ̂   ̃ 
( )   
is calculated. As there exists an automorphism   for 
which  ̃ 
( )   , the  -th row of the encryption matrix,  ̂ , 
is estimated with the probability  |   ( )|     
  . 
 Finally, using the estimated  ̂       , the encryption 5)
matrix   ̂  ( ̂ 
   ̂ 
     ̂ 
  ) is generated. If the solution is 
not correct, the steps 4 and 5 should be repeated.  
As mentioned earlier, the  -th row of the encryption matrix, 
  
 , can be successfully estimated with the probability 
|   ( )|  . In this case, the attacker should construct 
|   ( )|    
  encryption matrices to finally obtain the 
intended encryption matrix   . Therefore, obtaining the 
encryption matrix    requires the work factor of  (    
 ) 
operations. Apparently, if the value of |   ( )|       is large 
enough, this attack ends in failure. In our scheme, for a 
(        ) non-systematic polar code over   ( ), there are 
|   ( )|       intentional error vectors, implying that the ST 
attack is doomed to fail.  
D. Majority Voting Attack 
The Majority Voting (MV) is another kind of attack against 
which the cryptanalytic strength of the secret key 
cryptosystem based on channel coding has been analyzed [29].  
An equivalent secret key cryptosystem to RN scheme is 
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introduced in [28, 29] to be able to examine the strength of the 
RN scheme against MV attack.  
Let     [   
  ]                    be a binary     
equivalent encryption matrix with a right inverse (   )  . Let 
  be a corresponding binary (   )    parity check matrix 
such that        . Moreover,   {         } is a set of 
 -bit intentional error vectors satisfying the weight property 
and the syndrome property of the RN cryptosystem. Finally, 
the syndrome error table is constructed as   {   
 |    }.  
Encryption 
A  -bit message   is encrypted into an  -bit ciphertext   
by calculating               . 
Decryption 
A ciphertext   is decrypted as following the steps below: 
 Compute the syndrome                     . 1)
Find the corresponding error vector   from the syndrome 
error table  . 
 Retrieve the message  (   )(   )  .  2)
The aim of the MV attack is to recover the equivalent 
encryption matrix     by following a number of procedures as 
described below [29].  
1) Choose an arbitrary plaintext  , and compute a set of   
distinct encryptions of  , i.e.    {     
        
    }. Let    {        } denote the set of   distinct 
 -bit intentional error vectors. Then, compute  (  )  
 (    )   (  ) where  (  ) is an     matrix 
consisting of the ciphertexts          in its  -th row, 
respectively. Furthermore,  (    ) is an     matrix 
where the  -bit vector      is repeated in each row. 
Similarly,  (  ) is an     matrix consisting of the 
intentional error vectors          in its  -th row, 
respectively. The majority of the voting on each column 
of  (  ) yields an estimate     ̂, i.e. when 1s out 
number 0s in a column, the corresponding bit is set to 
ʻ1ʼ, and otherwise to ʻ0ʼ. 
2) Repeat the first step for a set of   linearly independent 
messages            and compute 
     ̂       ̂          ̂    
3) Finally, obtain an estimate of the encryption matrix as 
   ̂     ( ) (    ̂) where  ( ) is a     matrix 
consisting of the  -bit message          in its  -th 
row. Besides, (    ̂) is a     matrix consisting of the 
  estimates     ̂        in its  -th row. This way, the 
estimate of the encryption matrix     is obtained and used 
to break the equivalent cryptosystem. 
This attack requires   times   majority votes over   
coordinates. Therefore, the work factor requires an average 
number of  (   ) bit operations [29]. Considering the worst 
case, i.e.     , this attack will have a work factor of  
  (    ) bit operations. In the proposed cryptosystem, 
because of the large number of intentional error vectors, the 
work factor of this attack is   (    ), which is regarded as an 
evidence for the impracticality of the attack. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The current paper was an attempt to address the issue of 
applying non-systematic polar codes in the structure of secret 
key cryptosystems. The proposed scheme enjoys a number of 
advantages such as a higher security level and a shorter key 
length in comparison with the previous secret key 
cryptosystems based on channel coding. In addition, through 
combining the encryption and channel coding in a single step, 
this scheme has a potential to be implemented with a 
reasonable complexity which is suitable for secure high speed 
communications. 
In this study, we employ the non-systematic polar codes due 
to the following reasons: (1) Existing a large family of 
equivalent polar codes which leads to an increase of the 
security level against exhaustive search attacks. (2) The 
special structure of the generator matrix of polar codes, 
because of which the scheme achieves a smaller key size.     
(3) The non-systematic property of polar codes, by which a 
specific form of intentional error vectors is obtained that can 
provide a higher security level against chosen plaintext attacks 
and a smaller key length. (4) The low complexity encoding/ 
decoding of the polar codes. Moreover, the construction 
method of these codes is simple over BECs. 
The results of the investigations indicate that the security 
and reliability of our scheme depend on a variety of factors 
including the code length, code rate and secret information set. 
Therefore, in order to design a secure and reliable secret key 
scheme based on polar codes, these parameters should be 
selected in such a way that a suitable tradeoff is established 
between security and reliability.  
Our future work is to apply the polar codes in the structure 
of McEliece public key cryptosystem. However, it has to be 
noted that reducing the key length of McEliece cryptosystem 
based on polar codes is an interesting problem.  
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